

27 July 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

ILLEGIB SUBJECT: [redacted] Hanoi's "Four Points"

REFERENCE: [redacted] 25X1

1. Since April 1965, Hanoi's official policy position on the DRV's objectives in Vietnam and the necessary requirements for creating "favorable conditions" for a peaceful settlement making it "possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference along the pattern of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Vietnam" have been the "Four Points" laid down in an 8 April 1965 speech by Pham Van Dong. An extract from this speech giving the text of the four points is attached to this memorandum.

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ILLEGIB 2. On 22 July 1966, [redacted] distributed a report claiming that [redacted]

[redacted] stated that although insistence on Dong's Four Points as necessary conditions for discussion of a Vietnam settlement remained Hanoi's official position, in actuality Hanoi has adopted a somewhat different policy line. [redacted] the North Vietnam's actual present precondition, for considering a settlement are:

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- a. The United States must stop the bombings.
  - b. The United States must agree to withdraw from South Vietnam. [redacted] When asked if this meant just agreement to withdraw rather than actual complete withdrawal, [redacted] that it meant merely agreement).
  - c. The United States must agree to abide by the results of an election to be held in South Vietnam regardless of the results of that election.

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4. The "Four Points" [ ] are considerably more concrete than those enunciated by Pham Van Dong. They postulate one specific action (stopping the bombing of the North) and three relatively specific agreements (to withdraw, to abide by the results of an internal election within South Vietnam, and to accept the holding of a referendum on reunification within a specified time frame [ ] did not spell out what that election in South Vietnam was to be an election for, nor did he indicate the kind of time frame in question (months, years) for the reunification referendum.

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5 [ ] points are obviously not at all the same as Dong's, though they are not necessarily in radical conflict. Dong's speech was a statement of broad policy [ ] comments deal with more or less specific issues couched in language which makes discussion and bargaining theoretically -- or at least linguistically -- possible.

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6. There may well be some talk and thought within the upper reaches of the Lao Dong Politburo about the best way of translating broad policy formulations into specific negotiable issues. On the basis of such evidence as is in hand, however, I am inclined to think [ ] -- assuming our report of his remarks is accurate -- is indulging in intelligent and perhaps informed lower echelon speculation rather than revealing the substance of some actually received policy guideline. The authoritative and extremely hard-nosed 24 July article in Nhan Dan on the "Four Points" (copy attached) strongly suggests that even if there is some disposition in Hanoi to think in terms of specific negotiable issues that might be formulated for future surfacing at an appropriate time, there is as yet no appreciable give in North Vietnam's objectives or basic policy position.

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7. Also included for your information as an attachment to this memorandum is a detailed analysis of Dong's points (and the NLF's "Five Points") which was drafted by the Vietnamese Affairs Staff last January but is still pertinent and valid.

**GEORGE A. CARVER, JR.**  
Acting Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

**Attachments:**

1. [REDACTED]
2. Text of Pham Van Dong's "Four Points"
3. Text of 24 July Nhan Dan article
4. VAS Research Memo dtd 5 January 66

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